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In deciding first amendment cases the Supreme Court has often
used the phrase "less drastic means,"' or words signifying the same
thing,2 in finding that a governmental action has inhibited expression,
belief, or association more than the Constitution allows.
3 Similar
language appearing in non-first amendment decisions has stood for
the doctrine that the government, when it has available a variety of
equally effective means to a given end, must choose the measure which
least interferes with individual liberties.
4 The Court has not made
clear, however, what role the concept of less drastic means plays in
first amendment jurisprudence. In fact, it often appears that invoca-
tion of the phrase "less drastic means" does not so much explain the
result as announce it.
1. E.g., United States v. Robel, 889 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960).
2. E.g., "Precision of regulation," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); "reason-
ably drawn so that the precise evil is exposed," Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968).
Cases using this language are collected and described in Wormuth & Merkin, The Doc-
trine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254, 267-93 (1964).
3. The determination of inhibitory effect on protected expression must be preceded
by an analysis of the impact or coverage of a statute; the Court must first answer the
question of what activity will be affected by enforcement of the statute. This Note
ignores the manner in which that problem is resolved, and addresses itself only to the
next step-whether any of the covered activity is protected by the first amendment.
For this latter issue vagueness and overbreadth are the same thing; both are objec-
tionable because the legislation should have been drawn with more precision, or because
a different policy could have been pursued.
Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are too vague.
those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which Is
unquestionably safe.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon
absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of
legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amend-
ment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application . ..
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963). See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11, 19 (1966). Both a too vague and an overly broad statute, then, infringe upon (or
"chill') protected expression. Since such a statute has not adequately dliscriminated
between protected and unprotected, a less drastic means must be used.
It should be emphasized that vagueness and overbreadth are equated only for deter-
mination of the "chilling effect." It is recognized that prior analysis of a statute's
coverage requires a distinction between those concepts. The impact of a vague statute
will usually be more difficult to determine than that of more precise legislation. But cf.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), in which a quite specific statutory Loimand
was held to generate the fatal uncertainty normally associated with a vague statute.
4. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right to privacy; see also
Goldberg, J., concurring at 497-98, and White, J., at 503-04); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1965) (right to travel); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (legislation discriminating against interstate commerce). See also
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Recent pronouncements on the subject have only added more con-
fusion. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Shelton v. Tucker
5
stated that "the breadth of legislative abridgement" in an Arkansas
statute requiring public-school teachers to list all of their organiza-
tional affiliations each year "must be viewed in light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose,'", i.e., investigating the
fitness and competence of public-school teachers. The opinion then
went on to hold the requirement unconstitutional without mentioning
a less drastic alternative, saying only that the interference with associa-
tional freedom was far greater than could be justified by the state's
legitimate interest in its schools.7 In United States v. Robel
s decided
last term, the Court denied that it could consider whether Congress's
decision totally to ban Communists from employment in certain de-
fense plants was the best of several alternatives to prevent sabotage.
9
Though the Court insisted that analysis of alternative policies
played no role in its decision to strike down the provision,
0 the Justices
were well aware that President Truman had urged Congress to retain
then-existing, less drastic security measures--chiefly, investigation and
screening programs-rather than ban Communists altogether.""
1
Shelton and Robel suggest that the rhetoric of less drastic means
does not provide a trustworthy guide to what the Court is actually
doing with the concept. Clearly, the Supreme Court can often decide
cases which raise first amendment issues without appealing to less
drastic means: the means which the legislature has selected may be
the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in White Motor Co. v. United 
States. 372
U.S. 253, 271-72 (1963).
For a summary of the use of "less drastic means" doctrine in various areas of the
law, see Wormuth & Merkin, supra note 2. For analysis of its applicability to ca-s
involving economic regulation attacked under the due process clause, see Struve. The
Less-Restrictive Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HAry. L REV. 1463
(1967).
5. 364 US. 479 (1960).
6. Id. at 488.
7. Id. at 490.
8. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
9. It is not our function to examine the validity of . . . congressional judgment.
. . . We are concerned solely with determining whether the statute before us has
exceeded the bounds imposed by the Constitution when First Amendment rights
are at stake. The task of writing legislation has been committed to Congress.
Our decision today simply recognizes that, when legitimate legislative concerns
are at stake. The task of writing legislation has been committed to Congress....
Amendment activities, Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a "less
drastic" impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms.
389 U.S. at 267-68 (1967).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. See 389 U.S. at 267 (majority opinion); id. at 271 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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absolutely forbidden (for example, a bill of attainer 2); the end which
it seeks may be beyond its power 3 or too insubstantial to justify any
infringement on individual liberties, whether or not preferred; 14
finally, the expression involved might be of a type which the Court
has already determined to be protected,'5 leaving only the task of
deciding that an abridgement has occurred. In any of these cases the
presence of less drastic means is irrelevant to the constitutionality of
the measure that the legislature has adopted.
Most first amendment cases, however, rest on a balancing of the con-
flicting values and interests, whatever the Supreme Court calls the
process.' 6 While the Court could formulate a balancing test that did
12. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 828 U.S.
303 (1946). The problem of identifying any particular statute as a bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, law respecting the establishment of religion, etc., remains. Compare the
above cases with American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 839 U.S. 382 (1950).
13. E.g., a law denying to women the right to vote. But legislative power over the
goal of a statute is rarely in question; the following statement from Dehnis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), suggests the normal issue in a First Amendment case:
The question with which we are concerned here is not whether Congress has such
power, but whether the means which it has employed conflict with the First and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
Id. at 501.
14. A court might decide that for certain evils, such as littering, disloyalty to the
American system, or perverse sexual acts between consenting adults, any attempt to
punish or regulate is unjustified. The fact that expression, rather than something less
important, is being inhibited is irrelevant; the evil has been classified as per se Insub-
stantial. Very few statutes will meet this test of absolute insubstantiality; even littering
could become a grave danger to community health. The Supreme Court has never been
willing to tell Congress or a state legislature that its concerns were absolutely trivial.
Many cases, however, hold that the State interest in enforcing a statute is insubstantial
in relation to the inhibitory effect on expression. The dangers of littering and fraud
that exist when handbills are distributed on the street, Schneider v. State (City of
Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the necessity for undoubted loyalty to the government
in public teachers, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), a requirement
that the NAACP submit membership lists for local tax records, Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), or for business registration purposes, NAACP v. Alabama, 857
U.S. 449 (1958), are a few examples of states' interests which have been found Insubstantial
only in relation to the effect of the regulation on expression. While the Court may be
ready to forge a per se rule that some of these interests are trivial (e.g., loyalty) it has not
yet done so. The decision in each of these cases clearly depended on the effect of the regu-
lations upon expression.
15. Examples of "types" of speech are: political, inciting, literary, obscene and com-
mercial. A classifier can refine these categories as much as necessary to make his per se
rules of absolute protection do what he wants.
16. E.g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 867, 377 (1968):
. . we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if It is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest .. .;
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 577 (1965):
A state statute [regulating conduct with an incidental effect on expression] . .
would be unconstitutional if under the circumstances it appeared that the State's
interest in suppressing the conduct was not sufficient to outweigh the Individual's
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not include a comparison of alternative measures, 7 such a test could not
pretend to weigh the substantiality of the government's interest against
the value of the affected first amendment freedoms. A scale which puts
in one pan the public interest in some legitimate end of government-
national security, civil peace, or preservation of the machinery of justice
-rather than the interest in a particluar means to that end will rarely
tip in favor of competing values.' 8 Since the Court has in fact allowed
first amendment values to prevail even when the end pursued by the
government was urgent,19 it must do its balancing at the margin-that
interest in engaging in conduct closely involving his First Amendment freedoms.
(Black, J., concurring.)
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959):
Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation
resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing
private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown ... ;
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951):
[The test is] whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability.
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
(Vinson, C. J., quoting from lower court opinion, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950).)
There are two fundamental approaches to the first amendment: weighing and classifica-
tion. Unless a judge takes the latter approach, the central core of any first amendment
case is choosing between competing interests. Of course, many sorts of rules can govern
the weighing process. The "clear and present danger" test, for example, imposes on weigh-
ing the requirement that the evil at which the statute is directed be very serious and
the probability that it will occur if expression is unrepressed be very high. In practice,
such a test differs from one which merely requires a reasonable probability and a legiti-
mate state objective. But at the core of both tests is the weighing of state interest against
first amendment interest, and it to that core that "less drastic means" is relevant.
On the other hand, the distinction between weighing and classification is not always
dear. In order to determine which categories of expression deserve absolute protection.
or which ends and means should be absolutely forbidden the legislature, the classifier
must weigh the interests which are in conflict. Once this weighing has occurred, how-
ever, a judge is no longer required to reconsider competing interests case by case, but
has only to examine the expression in each new case to discover whether it fits into
the category for which a per se rule has been established. Mr. Justice Black, for
example, believes that weighing of the dangers of unfettered speech against its value
was carried out by the drafters of the Constitution, and that the result, a per se rule,
is the first amendment. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 679 (1960).
See generally Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 134, 143 (1959) (dissent); Konisberg v.
State Bar of California 366 US. 36, 56, 61 (1961) (dissent). But not all expression fits
within his per se rule. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 577 (1965) (concurrence) (where
infringement is indirect, test is case-by-case balancing); Adderly v. Florida, 385 US. 39
(1966) (when demonstrators assemble on jailhouse grounds, they are no longer protected
by the first amendment if prosecuted for trespassing).
Other Justices show much more flexibility in deciding whether to apply a categorical
label to a particular statute. Compare American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950), with United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). The importance of
distinguishing between classifying and weighing in a given case is that the concept
of less drastic means is useful only to a court willing to weigh competing interests.
17. Such a test appears to have been used in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
18. See T. EMERSON, ToWAmD A GENERAL THEORY OF TiE FiRsT AME ,MEtrr 55 (1963);
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE UJ. 1424, 1438-39 (19629).
19. Consider almost any case the government has lost. The state interest will nearly
always be urgent and impressive if viewed alone. But the danger of riot which exists
while an agitator is speaking will usually be lessened if numerous police mingle with
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is, it must balance no more than the state's interest in the added effec-
tiveness of the chosen means against the individual interest in the use
of less drastic ones.
Thus, when the Supreme Court holds that excluding all Communists
from defense facilities unconstitutionally stifles rights of association
and freedom,20 it has almost certainly decided that the gain in these
freedoms is worth whatever additional cost and risk inheres in a less
mechanical screening process-not that the national security would
never justify imposing such a burden on Party membership.2' Yet how
carefully the Court determines and weighs the presence of less drastic
means remains uncertain. In one sense, a less repressive or even
non-repressive alternative is always available, provided that the
government is willing to sacrifice effectiveness; 22 but if "less drastic
means" made that the test, it would simply signal that the right in
question had absolute protection. By some process or another, then,
the Justices must estimate how much less effective various alternative
means would be, how much more they would cost-not merely in
terms of the resources they would require, but also in terms of their
effects upon other, non-first amendment social values 23--and measure
against accompanying gains these losses to expression, association, and
belief.
A precise evaluation of less drastic means is an uncommonly difficult
task; and with respect to the first amendment it is fair to say that the
the crowd. So too will be the substantiality of the state's interest in preventing the
agitator from speaking. Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 331 (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting). The danger of harmful effects on children of titillating literary materials
and photographs is lessened by a law punishing those who give such materials to chil-
dren. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). On the other hand, even the distrilb-
tion of handbills would get to be a serious problem if there were no other methods of
controlling littering, libel, and fraud except the impermissible one of banning handbills.
Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 808
U.S. 147 (1939).
20. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
21. See note 19 supra.
22. Theoretical justification for the assumption that less drastic means are always
available is that the state has a choice of no law at all; the more satisfying practical
justification is that the cases expose no legislative goal that could be reached by only
one policy.
23. By definition, the less drastic alternative will inhibit exprcssion less than the
policy embodied by the statute before the Court. But this gain in first amendment
freedom might be accompanied by a destructive effect on other social or personal
values. For example, the alternative to a ban on inflammatory speech might be an
increase in the number of police at public meetings. Some would contend that hordes
of policemen are as repugnant as limited prior restraints on speech. Or, the alternative
to a ban on door-to-door solicitation could be a sign which warns away the unwanted,
but authorizes visits by those solicitors the homeowner wishes to see. Cf. Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 US. 141 (1941). Some would find their aesthetic sensibilities offended
by such a sign. Cf., e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 662, 640 (1951).
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Supreme Court has never attempted it.24 In some cases where the
Court has seemingly relied upon the availability of alternate measures,
the alternatives were so plainly equivalent in efficiency to those the
legislature had chosen that no sophisticated balancing was necessary
to reach the right result. Martin v. City of Struthers2 is arguably
this kind of case: there the Supreme Court ruled a city ordinance ban-
ning all door-to-door solicitations too severe an obstacle to free expres-
sion, considering that the danger of fraud could "be so easily controlled
by traditional legal methods .... ,,.0 In such a situation, however, the
Court does not really have to consider less drastic means at all. Any
sensible construction of the first amendment would forbid a legislature
to go out of its way to inhibit expression, either by design or accident,
and the choice of the harsher of equally effective means suggests that
suppression of speech was the legislature's real purpose from the start.
In fact, Justice Black, writing for the majority in Martin, expressly
concluded from the existence of the obviously effective alternatives
that the legislative intent was to squelch pamphleteering. 2
24. The closest that any Justice usually comes to analyzing alternative means in a first
amendment case is an admission that such analysis is necessary.
Whenever the reasonableness and fairness of a measure are at issue-as they are in
every case in which this Court must apply the standard of reason and fairness,
with the appropriate scope to be given those concepts, in enforcing the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation upon state action-the avail-
ability or unavailability of alternate methods of proceeding is germane.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 493 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Some comparative
findings were listed in the majority opinions in the Sunday Closing Cases, but there
the statutes were upheld and the first amendment found not to apply. McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1951).
A flagrant example of the Court's refusal to take non-first amendment values into
account occurs in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The Court mentions an
industrial screening program as a possible less drastic means; it would be hard to call
that measure "less repressive" without considering the loss of privacy it involhcs for all
potential defense plant workers. Cf. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1963). where the
Court's opinion suggests that such a program might itself be unconstitutional. Compare
the Court's opinion with the concurring opinion of Justice Fortas. Id. at 27-28.
25. 319 U.S. 141 (1941).
26. Id. at 147.
27. The dangers of distribution can be so easily controlled by traditional legal
methods . . . that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose other than that
forbidden by the constitution, the naked restriction of dissemination of idea%.
319 U.S. at 147. This statement might suggest that the availability of less drastic uteat's
is evidence of illegitimate purpose on the part of a legislature. (justice Frankfurter
distinguished Martin on those grounds in his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 540 (1951)).
Such an interpretation leads to confusion. In order for legislative intent to fonn an
independent basis for decisions, one must differentiate between the impact or effect
of a statute, and the personal "motives" behind its passage. Cf. A. BicEL, Tiu LEAsr
DANmoRous BRAxcH, 209-10 (1962). All would agree that the constitutionality of a statute
can be decided by analyzing its effects; to call these effects the "dominant purpos" of
the legislature adds nothing.
If, however, constitutionality depends on the motivc of a legislature, the concept
469
The Yale Law Journal
Another set of cases apparently evaluating less drastic means is
those in which the challenged action contains its own less drastic means,
such as a statutory provision that covers an easily identified group of
individuals not presenting any substantial threat of the evil which
prompted the government to act. Again, the Court does not have to
face differences in cost and effectiveness between the chosen means
and the less repressive alternative: the less drastic means is the same
statute, written more narrowly. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
28
for example, Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the Hatch Act
could have exempted non-administrative government employees from
its ban on participation in political activity without increasing the
risk of an overly partisan civil service.29 Yet the Court may not need
the concept of less drastic means to handle such cases either: due
process is sufficient to strike down a statute that groundlessly restricts
someone's freedom 30 Only if the government has some reason for sweep-
ing wide3- must the Court return to the less drastic means test, with all
its complex comparisons, to determine just how substantial is the state's
interest in the claimed "overbreadth."
becomes significant. A decision resting only on motive is not permanent, as the Court
recognized in United States v. O'Brien, 391 US 367, 384 (1968):
We decline to void essentially on the grounds that it is unwise legislation which
Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted In Its
exact form if the same or another legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.
Legislative motive is probably a factor in any subjective process of evaluating a
statute; it is almost certainly an unarticulated factor in a close first amendment case.
Since courts have no idea how to define and or prove legislative motive, O'Brien v.
United States, 391 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1968), it is unlikely that a court will rely on it
as the basis for decision. The hypothesis with which this footnote began-that the
availability of less drastic means is evidence of illicit motive-would probably be better
stated in reverse: the Court's suspicions about legislative motive will influence its
determination of the reasonable availability of alternate means.
28. 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
29. Id. at 120-26. Justice Douglas indicated that "industrial" employees posed no
general threat to the civil service system. Specific abuses were conceivable, but these
could be dealt with by specific regulations. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967), the Court criticized one section of the Feinberg Law for failing to discrimi.
nate between employees in "sensitive" versus "non-sensitive" positions in the public
school system; disloyal employees in non-sensitive jobs presumably were not a danger
to anyone. Id. at 607. In both of these cases the statute was separable at no cost to
the state.
30. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. Where overbreadth involves anything but an easily identifiable class of persons,
the cost of restricting a statute is usually greater than the cost of enforcing the overbroad
legislation. In Keyishian, for example, the Court said that the Feinberg Law could only
be enforced against those with "specific intent" to overthrow the government by force.
385 U.S. at 608. To distinguish between those with specific intent and others would be
more expensive in terms of enforcement resources than merely separating those In"sensitive" and "non-sensitive" positions. Other examples of similar statutes for which
restricting coverage would increase cost include Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964) (law withholding passports from Communists but not requiring specific
intent held overbroad), and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (law which punished
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Faced with the task of analyzing a case in terms of less drastic means,
the Supreme Court has apparently solved the problem of comparing
cost and effectiveness by assuming it away. Not only does the Court
fail to compare the governmental action at issue with others that could
have been taken, but it also generally refuses to specify what other
means it has in mind.32 Perhaps this reticence is due to the fear of
giving an advisory opinion: once the Court has named a less drastic
means, not to uphold it subsequently might be less than politic. More-
over, an articulated comparison of alternatives raises the danger that
the state will use its superior fact-finding and publicity machinery to
discredit the Court's decision.
Concern over rendering an advisory opinion does seem appropriate
in a narrow class of cases; for most, the alternative means either will
be traditional (and hence tested) legal methods,33 or will be a less
repressive statute of the same design as the one at issue. Conceivably,
however, an attack on a statute repressing first amendment liberties
might argue that the government could have effectively employed a
completely different measure; this alternative might raise constitutional
questions other than those applicable to the statute before the Court.
In Robel, for example, the Court at least hinted that an industrial
screening program would be less drastic than a total ban on Commu-
nists in defense plants,3 4 while a later case implies that a too thorough
screening program may itself violate constitutional rights of privacy.35
To balance loss in effectiveness and resources against gain in first
amendment freedoms where the alternative is very dissimilar, the Court
may also have to decide the constitutionality of the alternate means.
sale of obscene books without requiring proof that the seller had knowledge of obscene
content held overbroad).
Furthermore, the belief that two measures are equally effective is rarely true. The
overbreadth in Mitchell and Keyishian (see note 80 supra) covers employees whose threat
to the state is slight, not null. If the evil being legislated against is urgent enough-as
in a statute protecting national security-the government will argue that even a slight
or remote danger justifies repression of the rights of expression for the class of persons
who present the lesser threat.
32. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker. 864 U.S. 479
(1960). In some cases where laws already existing are sufficient to contain the evil toward
which the more repressive measure is aimed, the Court will indicate what those laws are.
See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 US. 380 (1957); cf. Martin v. City of Struthers. 319
US. 141 (1941); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939), where the
Court refers to "traditional legal methods."
33. See p. 472 infra.
34. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); see p. 465 supra.
35. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24-27 (1968). The Court suggested that requiring
the plaintiff to list membership in 250 named organizations as part of a screening pro-
gram for the Merchant Marine was invalid under Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479 (1960).
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A much more likely explanation of the Court's failure to give
careful analyses of alternate means is that it does not believe itself
competent to do so.-" There are no committees to look into alternative
measures for the Justices, no staff of specialists to interpret data;
there are only the arguments of lawyers to show what the cost and
effectiveness of other means would be. Instead of attempting to calcu-
late differences in cost and effectiveness, the Court has usually limited
its survey of less drastic measures to "traditional legal methods"
1
and assumed, on the basis of society's long experience with them, that
these methods would be reasonably effective, practical, and inoffensive
ways by which the state could accomplish the ends it claimed to seek.
Thus, libel suits and criminal prosecutions are less drastic means of
preventing defamatory or fraudulent publications than enjoining the
publisher from printing his newspaper 3
8 or prohibiting a pamphleteer
from distributing his leaflets; 39 specific laws are less repressive than
breach-of-the-peace statutes; 40 requiring the government to look to
the intent of a possible subversive is an alternative to banning all
Communists from defense plants41 or public schools;
42 punishing false
advertising is less drastic than prohibiting unsigned handbills;
18 and
punishing fraudulent misrepresentation is preferable to requiring that
union organizers register with state officials."
4 Relying on the existence
of familiar methods of dealing with certain types of problems, the
Court can hold that the government has adopted overly repressive
means with some confidence that it has not ventured onto a limb. In
cases where traditional legal methods are not visible in the foreground,
or where the statute cannot be narrowed on its face, the Court often
uses some other-possibly concealed-route to its result: it questions
36. Presumably comparison of alternatives is not outside the Court's institutional
power, since it does make value choices between different policies by weighing. 
If one
accepts that weighing must involve consideration of alternate means for accomplishing
the legislative goal, the only issue remaining is the degree to which the Court should
seek information about efficiency and cost. For an argument that the Court has been
too timid, and that it should take evidence in the form of "legislative facts," see Karot,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75.
37. E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943). See also Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
38. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
39. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
40. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
41. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
42. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606-10 (1966). See also Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
43. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
44. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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the state's intent, 45 it applies a per se rule of absolute protection,0 it
caves in to its own version of political necessity,47 or it discovers that
the first amendment does not apply to the situation at hand.18
All of these shortcuts around the complexities of an analysis of
reasonable alternatives, while arguably justified in most cases where
they have been taken, raise questions about judicial use of the concept.
The presence of less drastic means language in opinions invites the
government to show that it has already found other means unsuccessful,
or that reasonably effective alternatives do not exist4 9 thereby preserv-
ing the Court to uphold actions without trying to weigh the absolute
importance of the interest behind the state's abridgement of liberty.w
If Congress or the states take up the gauntlet less drastic means opin-
ions appear to throw down and begin to write into the preambles of
legislation essays on the unavailability of alternatives, the Court could
find that invocation of traditional legal methods would no longer be
enough.
The notion of less drastic means thus poses a dilemma for the
Supreme Court. It cannot use a balancing test and ignore less repres-
45. Three cases involving the NAACP in southern states can be best understood by
reference to governmental purpose in enforcing laws which are otherwise valid. NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama.
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
46. The Court in Robel explicitly denied that it was balancing competing interests.
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967). The only remaining explanation
is that "mere" membership is a per se protected associational right, and that repression
of the associational rights of employees in non-sensitive positions is a means absolutely
forbidden to Congress.
47. E.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US. 1 (1961).
Frantz criticizes Justice Frankfurter for not meeting the argument that the SACB was
unnecessary in light of other security measures already in force. Franz, The First Amend-
ment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440 n.72 (1962) (citing Z. CitAFEE, THE Bssiscs
oF LmraRv 122-36 (1956), to prove that the SACB served no useful function).
48. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Compare Adderly v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration on jailhouse grounds), with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965) (demonstration in streets near State Capitol), and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963) (demonstration on State House grounds).
49. The federal government made this argument and lost in United States v. Robel,
389, 258, 267 (1967), as did South Carolina in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, -107 (1963).
(1963).
50. The free press-fair trial problem suggests an example. In Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court lists seven policies, none of which places a direct restraint
on the press, that should be used to insure that a recalcitrant press does not lessen
the defendant's opportunity to get a fair trial. 384 U.S. at 358-63. In the trial of James
Earl Ray, all of these measures seem inadequate to full) protect the defendant's right
to an impartial jury and unprejudicial courtroom atmosphere. The trial judge recently
cited for contempt two newsmen who printed details about Ray's confinement in viola-
tion of a court order. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1968, at 48, col. 1. In determining the constitu-
tionality of this restraint on the flow of information, a court willing to balance should
decide whether prejudice incurred by news stories is more or less important than an
unfettered courthouse press. The danger suggested here is that the court will be lulled
into accepting the inadequacy of other means as conclusive and not realize the necessity
for a choice between the competing values.
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sive ways to achieve the governmental goal unless it is willing to give
the state interest overwhelming weight in the balance.5' On the other
hand, the Court's implicit admission that it is not qualified to choose
between various means, coupled with the deference that should be paid
the legislature's choice, tends to vitiate any less drastic means test. Pro-
cedural devices, such as requiring the government to prove the absence
of reasonable alternatives when it threatens a serious infringement of
first amendment freedoms, might offer an escape in some cases, 2
though it might also provide the Justices with arguments they could
not readily assess. But unless the Court adopts a priori notions of what
is and is not protected expression or forbidden means, each different
case will require a new choice between the conflicting values of the
state's interest and the first amendment values. Since the Court lacks
the competency to measure the relative efficiency, cost, and repressive
effect of alternative measures, consideration of less drastic means cannot
provide any form or structure to this choice. The search for standards
that will make the adjudicative process more explicable must go for-
ward without the illusion that "less drastic means" gives the Court a
useful tool in first amendment cases.
51. See p. 467 supra.
52. The suggestion that the burden is on the government to show lack of other
available means was made most recently in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940). What this burden means is unclear, but It Is
conceivable that a court could rest its decision not on the availability of other means,
but rather on the government's failure of proof. Such a holding would be less objection-
able in terms of the separation of powers doctrine.
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